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ABSTRACT 
Rousseau notoriously praises ignorance and censures learning for the moral corruption 
that it has inflicted upon his age, yet he admits that the arts and the sciences are good in 
themselves. I consider the effects of learning and knowledge on moral education, in an effort to 
answer the following question: What is the role of ignorance in moral education for Rousseau?  
While some interpreters have acknowledged his sensitivity to various groups in society with 
regard to moral education, none has properly systematized the different types of ignorance that 
Rousseau praises or identified the benefits of those types of ignorance to various individuals and 
societies.  I distinguish the savage’s ignorance from that of Socrates and identify another 
important type of ignorance, the benefits of which stem from our natural sentiment and innate 
curiosity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts and in the Discourse on the Origins and 
Foundation of Inequality, Rousseau praises ignorance (both that of the savage and that of 
Socrates) and censures learning (i.e., the sciences and the arts) for the moral corruption that it has 
inflicted upon his age, yet he admits that the arts and the sciences are good in themselves. 
Rousseau offers a less sensational account of these negative effects of learning and, perhaps 
more importantly, a deeper account of the benefits of ignorance in the Emile.  In this thesis, I will 
consider the effects of learning and knowledge on moral education, in an effort to answer the 
following question: What is the role of ignorance in moral education for Rousseau? 
Previous scholarship has discussed Rousseau’s praise of ignorance.  Even interpreters 
(e.g., Clifford Orwin and Jeff J.S. Black) who have been careful to point out his sensitivity to 
various groups in society with regard to moral education, however, have not systematically 
treated the different types of ignorance that Rousseau praises or the benefits of those types of 
ignorance to various individuals and societies.  Ignorance’s significance for moral education in 
Rousseau’s thought cannot be properly understood without distinguishing between at least two 
sorts of ignorance.  Both types of ignorance can be beneficial forms of ignorance and must be 
considered in any attempt to morally educate an individual or a society for Rousseau.  Orwin’s 
claim that Rousseau wishes to garner popular support in the First Discourse by flattering the 
people and avoiding criticism of them is discredited if we recognize this fundamental distinction 
between the types of ignorance and its upshot. 
I will argue that, when Rousseau praises Socrates in the First Discourse, the object of his 
praise is Socrates’ humble sort of ignorance (i.e., accepting a state of uncertainty about many 
important matters).  Humility and awareness of one’s own ignorance can be fundamental to 
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acting rightly and to achieving the good life.  In praising Socrates’ humble ignorance, Rousseau 
is lamenting society’s contentment with its plethora of false convictions.  The latter, for 
Rousseau, stem from vain desires to acquire knowledge before one needs it or is prepared to 
understand it, and Rousseau’s primary effort as a moral educator is to prevent the birth of vanity, 
which marks the corruption of an inherently good individual and which corrupts society.  As an 
explicit acknowledgment of one’s limitations, the humble sort of ignorance serves to prevent one 
from extending beyond the scope of one’s faculties and from engaging in other vain efforts. 
Socrates’ humble ignorance must be distinguished, however, from another sort of 
ignorance that receives Rousseau’s praise and, moreover, seems to be a prerequisite for the 
humble sort of ignorance.  Ignorance understood as the absence of both knowledge and any 
misconceptions in the place of the knowledge gap is also essential to moral education for 
Rousseau.  This type of ignorance has two aspects – a) the natural proclivity of the mind to make 
judgments only on what is within the scope of accurate discernment, and b) the absence of 
knowledge itself, which is generally a product of a soul that has maintained its natural inclination 
to remain and to operate within the scope of its faculties.  The first aspect relates to the latter by 
intuitively determining when the preservation of this innate absence of knowledge is merited.  
This natural tendency of the mind is crucial for determining what is within the mind’s grasp and 
is important to know.  This determination occurs via natural sentiment (as will be discussed) and 
innate curiosity, for Rousseau.  Together, the two aspects of this type of ignorance appear to be 
the foundation from which the individual develops the humble sort of ignorance, or a conscious 
acceptance of one’s uncertainty about many important matters. 
One benefit of this sort of ignorance for Rousseau is its conduciveness to clarity of mind; 
Rousseau maintains that learning can be bad for decision-making, because the human mind 
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thinks more reasonably and clearly when it is not overburdened by a plethora of opinions.  The 
natural savage certainly possesses this form of ignorance, but it also can be present in a modern 
man who lives a simple life that resembles that of our natural state (e.g., a peasant).  He contends 
that the moral educator should limit exposure to a variety of opinions when educating individuals 
whose judgment would be impaired by such a burdensome range of ideas or whose souls would 
be corrupted by those ideas. 
As man is naturally good and, in a sense, can only become worse by study, another 
benefit of ignorance is derived from our natural sentiment (consisting of the sentiments of self-
preservation and of pity), which guides us to morally upright behavior.  Rousseau believes that 
the principles of morality are largely known to us and that the rigorous study of them tends to 
corrupt more often than edify.  Attempting to exceed the limitations of our natural faculties 
through study for which we are not ready is one way in which our amour-propre becomes 
inflamed.  Born through the mental development of our reasoning faculty, amour-propre allows 
us to compare ourselves to others.  While amour-propre derives from the naturally good 
sentiment of amour de soi and can have good manifestations, knowledge and vain learning can 
lead to bad passions that are corrupted forms of amour-propre.   
As evidenced in the Letter to d’Alembert on the Theater, Rousseau’s “Replies” to critics 
of the Discourses, the Preface to ‘Narcissus,’ and the Emile, Rousseau’s approach to moral 
education is contingent upon the individual or the society to be educated.  While an uncorrupted 
individual or society’s ignorance of the sciences and the arts should be preserved as much as 
possible, learning may be the only remedy to the ills of a corrupted society or individual.  In 
addition, only individuals who can retain their goodness and humility as their knowledge 
increases should be educated in philosophy. 
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II. ROUSSEAU’S ACCOUNT OF THE NATURAL GOODNESS OF HUMANITY 
A sketch of Rousseau’s account of human nature, with a view to the aspects of human 
nature that bear on the question of ignorance’s benefits to humanity, is helpful in laying the 
psychological foundation for the benefits of ignorance.  The key terms and concepts (pertaining 
to human nature) that are used throughout this work are defined and expounded, respectively, in 
this chapter.  Rousseau believes “that man is naturally good;”1 he insists that this idea is integral 
to his philosophical system.
2
  “The fundamental principle of all morality about which I have 
reasoned in all my Writings and developed in this last one with all the clarity of which I was 
capable, is that man is a naturally good being, loving justice and order,” Rousseau writes, 
referencing the Emile in particular.
3
  Despite his deep concern with goodness, he is content to 
avoid creating complex ethical systems of behavior for the purpose of determining when one has 
done good and when one has done bad.  Rather, he seeks to convince his reader that the human 
heart is fundamentally good. 
Rousseau’s insistence upon using the term “good” to summarize human nature, when 
unaccompanied by a convoluted definition of the term, suggests that he is appealing to a 
common-sense view of the term to convince us that human nature is good.  However, as will be 
discussed, Rousseau’s good man does not necessarily live up to the standards that are commonly 
used to evaluate whether someone is deserving of the label ‘good.’  While the term may elicit the 
thought of an altruist (e.g., Mother Teresa) who sacrifices personal indulgences to devote her 
                                                          
1
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  “Second Letter of 1762 to Malesherbes” in The Confessions and Correspondence, 
Including the Letters to Malesherbes.  Christopher Kelly, Roger D. Masters, and Peter G. Stillman, eds. Translated 
by Christopher Kelly.  (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1995), 575.   
2
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Letter to Beaumont, in Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the Mountain and 
Related Writings.  Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace, eds.  Translated by Judith R. Bush and Christopher Kelly. 
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), 28. 
3
 Ibid., 28. 
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time, effort, and money to perform good deeds for others, Rousseau does not contend that we are 
all good by these standards. 
To do good is to fulfill our self-interest, properly understood, and it contributes to our 
happiness, according to Rousseau.  Amour de soi, a central concept in Rousseau’s theory of 
human nature, encompasses the desire for self-preservation and “is always good.”4   He states in 
Note XV to the Second Discourse, amour de soi “is a natural sentiment which moves every 
animal to be vigilant in its own preservation and which, directed in man by reason and modified 
by pity, produces humanity and virtue.”5  As Joshua Cohen argues, amour de soi “includes 
concerns to preserve ourselves and to protect the means of that preservation.”6 
Amour de soi and pity are two inherent sentiments that combine to form natural 
sentiment, which moves us toward our good.  Amour-propre develops with reason and represents 
an array of passions in which one relates or compares oneself to others.  It is the source of both 
good (e.g., the desire for deserved honor) and bad (e.g., vanity) passions that one can 
experience.
7
  The order of the soul (understood as the feeling or passion that most guides the 
soul) is a key factor in determining the proper educational approach for a given individual or 
society.  To maximize on the order of the soul is to efficiently treat the soul in question 
according to the order of the soul, with a view to achieving good (or to preventing bad 
consequences) for society.  Whether a soul is guided by natural sentiment, honor, or a false 
passion, an educator should maximize on the order of the soul to enable those who can do good 
                                                          
4
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Emile, or On Education.  Translated by Allan Bloom.  (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
1979), 213. 
5
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Discourse on the Origins and Foundation of Inequality, or the Second Discourse, in 
Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings.  Victor Gourevitch, ed.  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 106. 
6
 Joshua Cohen.  Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals.  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 101. 
7
 Both amour de soi and amour-propre will be explored further in Chapter V. 
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to do the most good possible and to prevent from doing bad those who have lost their capacity to 
do good.  An educator should seek, when possible, to preserve goodness and, thus, natural 
sentiment, for the sake of a good, happy society.  If natural sentiment and the desire for honor are 
absent from a society, and if one is unable to decrease or reorient the false passions, then one 
would need to maximize on other passions, including the fear of “appearing ridiculous”8 and 
other forms of vanity to achieve a good, happy society to the extent possible. 
In what does our natural goodness consist? One significant part of this natural goodness 
is the inclination to yield to necessity.  With regard to human behavior, necessity refers to the 
state of affairs that determines what can and must be performed in order to survive or to fulfill 
one’s needs.9  As Allan Bloom states in his Introduction to the Emile, “Against necessity he will 
not rebel; it is only the possibility of overcoming necessity or the notion that there is a will 
lurking behind it which disturbs his unclouded relation to things as they are.”10  Rousseau 
contends that this capacity to submit to necessity can be debilitated by the perception that a 
human or other will is attempting to intervene with one’s freedom to pursue one’s interests.  
“Rousseau says that a child who is not corrupted and wants a cookie will never rebel against the 
phrase, ‘There are no more,’ but only against, ‘You cannot have one,’” states Bloom.11  In other 
words, we are not at all vain or manipulative in our natural disposition; vanity and superfluity are 
                                                          
8
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau. “Preface to ‘Narcissus,’” in Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings.  
Victor Gourevitch, ed.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 103. 
9
 While the word ‘necessity’ has various technical metaphysical connotations for many in the world of philosophy, 
Rousseau is using the word in a more basic sense of what is necessary for existence and what necessarily cannot be 
avoided (in life).  As will be seen, Rousseau is concerned with vain responses to one’s circumstances in life (e.g., 
vainly checking the same cabinet repeatedly for a can of baked beans when necessity has clearly determined that one 
will not have access to beans until the flooded streets no longer prevent one from leaving the house). 
10
 Allan Bloom.  Introduction to the Emile.  (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1979), 11. 
11
 Ibid., 12. 
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in the domain of corrupted society, not of natural human beings, such as Emile.  “Do not rebel 
against the hard law of necessity,” Rousseau advises.12   
 Insofar as necessity demands it, we naturally enhance our ability to preserve ourselves 
and are devoid of laziness in the face of trials, leading to our self-sufficiency.  Various activities, 
including learning about one’s environment, are required for this preservation.  “It is thus that 
nature, which does everything for the best, constituted him in the beginning.  It gives him with 
immediacy only the desires necessary to his preservation and the faculties sufficient to satisfy 
them,” Rousseau declares.13  Children, of course, have the desire to play,14 and playing sports 
and other games is a form of exploration and of exercise, the latter having an obvious connection 
to our physical health and our preservation.
15
  Indeed, Rousseau sets up safe playing 
environments for Emile throughout his education’s first stages,16 in which he develops his 
physical strength and plays games that educate his senses. 
 Rousseau argues that we are also, by nature, motivated to learn; in other words, we are 
curious from birth.  “At first children are only restless; then they are curious; and that curiosity, 
well directed, is the motive of the age we have now reached,” Rousseau states.17  If uncorrupted, 
a child will naturally develop a sense of curiosity about the world in which he lives, at least as it 
relates to the child’s life.  However, this curiosity is distinct from the vain interests of learned 
men, such as philosophers, and other frivolous men who seek knowledge of trivial matters that 
cannot possibly contribute to the betterment of humanity or who are learning for the sake of vain 
                                                          
12
 Rousseau.  Emile, 83. 
13
 Ibid., 80. 
14
 Ibid., 155. 
15
 Ibid., 146-147. 
16
 Ibid., 146. 
17
 Ibid., 167. 
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displays of their knowledge in a pedantic way.  Rousseau explains, “There is an ardor to know 
which is founded only on the desire to be esteemed as learned.”18 
“[T]here is an ardor which is born of a curiosity natural to man concerning all that might 
have a connection, close or distant, with his interests,” Rousseau writes regarding Emile’s type 
of curiosity.
19
  Human beings naturally possess the drive to seek knowledge of important matters, 
or matters that can improve one’s condition and the condition of one’s fellow beings.20  We are 
naturally inclined to be curious about whatever interests us, and, as rational beings, we are 
primarily interested in what relates to our human existence, or to our needs.
21
  The desire for 
self-preservation, combined with the natural inclination to yield to necessity, move us to take 
care of ourselves and, thus, enable us to be self-sufficient by nature. 
  Apart from the self-sufficiency of which human beings are capable, our tendency to have 
pity is what makes us good.
22
  Pity is a sentiment, possessed innately, that gives us a natural 
repugnance to the suffering of others and can move us to acts of “generosity, Clemency,”23 and 
“gentleness,” as Nicholas Dent points out.24  By not having been corrupted, the natural sentiment 
of pity is preserved and, even, abstracted by reasoning to a notion of justice.  The concern for 
others is a product of “amour-propre;”25 herein lies what is commonly regarded as good by 
humanity – altruism.  However, it is possible, according to Rousseau, for pity to remain alive in 
the human heart but not to be generalized to all of humankind.
26
  If pity is only felt for those who 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., 167. 
19
 Ibid., 167. 
20
 Ibid., 233. 
21
 Ibid., 167. 
22
 Ibid., 223-226. 
23
 Second Discourse, 153. 
24
 Nicholas J. H. Dent.  A Rousseau Dictionary.  (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 51. 
25
 Ibid., 92. 
26
 Ibid., 253. 
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are in close proximity to oneself, then pity has not been generalized.
27
  Abstraction of one’s 
feeling of pity to the whole of humanity requires reason; for that generalization to remain with 
the individual requires strength of will, according to Rousseau.
28
 
Moreover, man naturally wants to do good for those whom he loves, and he experiences 
affection for anyone who he perceives to be good-willed toward him.
29
  Understood with respect 
to the generalization of pity, this claim merely suggests that, while one would like to relieve 
suffering and to achieve justice generally,
30
 one is even more disposed toward doing the good for 
those whom one recognizes as disposed to doing the same for oneself out of their own free will.  
(This idea is the fundamental basis for the naturalness of community for a reasoning human 
being, which is central to most of Rousseau’s educational approaches).   
 According to Rousseau, doing good is what enables us to be happy; doing good is in our 
self-interest, even if it does not lead to personal material gain.  Countering the attack on morality 
that claims people only do what is in their self-interest, Rousseau agrees that self-interest guides 
us but rejects the claim that this signifies the impossibility of morality.
31
  Rousseau argues that it 
is nonsensical to imagine that one acts without any interest.
32
  Rousseau advises Monsieur 
d’Offreville, “Your adversary maintains that everyone, no matter what he does, acts only in 
relation to himself, and that even in the most sublime acts of virtue, even in the purest works of 
charity, everyone relates everything to himself,”33 and he is correct.  Rousseau explains, “When 
we act, we have to have a motive for acting, and this motive cannot be extrinsic to ourselves, 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., 253. 
28
 Ibid., 253. 
29
 Ibid., 213. 
30
 Rousseau.  Letter to Beaumont, 28. 
31
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  “1761 Letter to d’Offreville,” in Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later 
Political Writings.  Victor Gourevitch, ed.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 261. 
32
 Ibid., 261. 
33
 Ibid., 261. 
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since it is ourselves it sets to work.”34  As our own inner motives are what spring us to action, the 
motive to act must come from an interest within us. 
Rousseau notes, “But the word interest calls for explanation, because you might attach to 
it a meaning, you and your adversary, such that you agree without knowing it.”35  Thus, 
Rousseau explicitly suggests that the word ‘interest’ can be ambiguous, and he proceeds to 
clarify this question, on which a demonstrable morality relies, by distinguishing among different 
types of interest.  While this may perhaps seem trivial to the overall scheme of Rousseau’s 
thought, interpretation of Rousseau’s position on the matter can result in fundamentally different 
interpretations of Rousseau on human nature.  Bertram, for example, argues, “Rousseau believes 
that human beings are fundamentally self-interested,”36 and he concludes from Rousseau’s 
comments on amour de soi, or self-love, that Rousseau’s belief in human goodness merely 
prevents us from being in “endemic conflict with”37 one another. 
Describing the corrupted form of self-interest that leads us to desire excessive wealth and 
to consider the opinions of others, Rousseau states that “There is a sensible and tangible interest 
which bears solely on our material well-being, on fortune, on consideration, on the physical 
goods that may accrue to us from another’s good opinion.”38  Rousseau admits that actions 
stemming from such interest “cannot be called good deeds.”39  However, there is an interest 
“entirely unrelated to social advantages, which is relative to ourselves, to the good of our soul,” 
which he calls “spiritual or moral interest.  It is the only interest which tends to our genuine 
                                                          
34
 Ibid., 261. 
35
 Ibid., 261. 
36
 Bertram, Christopher.  Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Rousseau and the Social Contract. (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2004), 19. 
37
 Ibid., 20. 
38
 Rousseau.  “Letter to d’Offreville,” 261. 
39
 Ibid., 262. 
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happiness, since it is intimately related to our interest.”40  Tying such actions to the concept of 
virtue, for which one must struggle to do right, Rousseau states, “This is the interest which virtue 
pursues and ought to pursue, and in no way deprives actions of moral goodness.”41 
In an example that is not being used in an effort to make us understand his diagnosis of 
society’s ills and is, instead, used to explain morality and to show that we derive happiness from 
fulfilling our self-interest, Rousseau offers the case of a juror (who is himself the criminal) who 
refuses to condemn an innocent man, despite an apparent and sensible interest in doing so.  In 
this example, an Englishman was on a jury of twelve in a system that required unanimity before 
jurors could leave the room or eat anything. Having himself committed the crime, the juror knew 
that the accused was innocent, yet he was the only juror to dissent to the conviction of the 
accused person.  Despite being an unjust man, “he had been less horrified by the prospect of 
death than by the prospect of causing the death of the innocent man accused of his own crime.”42  
Rousseau writes, “he had the most real interest in condemning the accused (…), and no 
discernable or sensible interest had to lead him to do what he did; yet only a very powerful 
interest could have swayed him.  What was it?”43  Rousseau is arguing that the juror’s self-
interest is served by acting in this way, because he is fulfilling his moral interest, which is a very 
powerful interest.  Our moral interest, or our interest in doing what is morally right and good for 
both ourselves and for others, is a real interest for Rousseau, even if it is not a tangible interest. 
As the above quotation regarding the happiness that we derive from fulfilling our moral 
interest suggests,
44
 Rousseau appears to hold that doing the good is what enables us to be happy.  
                                                          
40
 Ibid., 262. 
41
 Ibid., 262. 
42
 Ibid., 263. 
43
 Ibid., 263-264. 
44
 Ibid., 262. 
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This does not in any way belie the claim made earlier, though, that Rousseau admits that we 
experience incontinence, or weakness of will.  We can be too weak to do the good, but it remains 
that we wish that we could do the good.  In other words, the strength to do the good is often 
required to be happy.  “It is certain that to do good for the sake of good is to do it for one’s own 
sake, out of self-interest, since it gives the soul an internal satisfaction, a contentment with itself 
without which there is no true happiness,”45 but “the wicked are all wretched,”46 because 
wickedness is not what leads to our true happiness.
47
  “But why would Emile ever be in a hurry?  
For one reason alone – to enjoy life.  Shall I add another – to do good when he can? No, for that 
itself is to enjoy life,” Rousseau declares.48  As Emile’s human nature has been preserved 
through his rare education, human nature consists in what Emile’s happiness consists in.  Thus, 
to perform what is good when one has the capacity to do so is how one enjoys life.  In other 
words, it is natural to be happy when one does the good that is within one’s capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 Ibid., 264. 
46
 Ibid., 264. 
47
 Ibid., 264. 
48
 Rousseau.  Emile, 411. 
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III. THE PRAISE OF THE SAVAGE’S IGNORANCE 
In describing what he believes to be ‘natural,’ Rousseau emphasizes the frequent 
occurrence of and dangers of attributing to nature the corruptions that derive from living in 
society.  Today, very little remains of our true nature, which Rousseau describes as good.  
Having been fully immersed in society
49
 and taught how to be polite instead of how to be 
virtuous,
50
 we are not our true selves; worst of all, we are incessantly hiding any remnants of our 
true selves from on-lookers.
51
  Rousseau speculates about the initial state of man’s existence, or 
about the state of nature; “these investigations so difficult to carry out, and to which so little 
thought has so far been devoted,”52 allow Rousseau to find a pre-political mode of being that is 
radically different from any that presently exists. 
 For Rousseau, “the facts […] do not affect the question,”53 because Rousseau is not 
attempting to describe history as it actually occurred but to explain the human mind by removing 
it from the corrupting forces of society.  Rousseau depicts man in his most animalistic state, as a 
savage without political institutions, sciences, arts, and other potential corruptors. 
[…] wandering in the forests without industry, without speech, without settled abode, without 
war and without tie, without any need of others of his kind and without any desire to harm 
them, perhaps without ever recognizing any one of them individually, subject to few passions 
and self-sufficient, Savage man had only the sentiments and the enlightenment suited to this 
                                                          
49
 Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and the Sciences, or the First Discourse, in Rousseau: The Discourses and Other 
Early Political Writings.  Victor Gourevitch, ed.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 7. 
50
 Ibid., 8. 
51
 Ibid., 8. 
52
 Rousseau, Exordium to the Second Discourse, 125. 
53
 Ibid., 132. 
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state, that he sensed only his true needs, looked only at what he believed it to be in his interests 
to see, and that his intelligence made no more progress than his vanity.
54
 
 The savage described above represents one of our virtuous forms of ignorant man; 
furthermore, this form of person is common to all of us in its naturalness, as we all have sprung 
from this form of man.  Theoretically, our earliest ancestors did not attempt to take any 
advantage of their capacity for speech, allowing them the pure virtue that defined them.  In the 
Discourses, Rousseau frequently condemns the insincere or the deceitful use of speech.  While 
good people know how “to act well,” the famous people of the Republic of Letters know “how to 
speak well,” Rousseau states.55  Rousseau considers the potential puzzlement of the Roman 
general Fabricius if he were to witness Rome’s profligacy, “Do rhetoricians govern you?” 56 
 In our natural state, we are independent, roaming scavengers who do not engage in 
commerce or dialogue with our fellow beings.  There is no “notion of thine and mine;”57 
Rousseau thereby avoids most conflicts occurring over property.  Indeed, according to Rousseau, 
we may not even recognize the few people who we have encountered before and do not even 
know our own children.  The concerns of the natural man are not wealth, family, science, art and 
leisure; each of these concerns makes us dependent on other people. 
 Instead, we aim merely at our own preservation.  Without the burdens of civil society and 
of commerce, man lived like other animals, unaware of the extravagant lifestyles that they could 
lead and naturally moved by their survival instincts to acquire only food, drink, and sex.
58
  Food 
and drink were in abundance, just as animals living in nature today are able to satisfy their 
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hunger and thirst; institutionalized slavery and exploitation of others had yet to occur and to 
inhibit this felicitous state.  The physical desire for sex was not yet accompanied by this desire’s 
moral aspect, which “focuses it exclusively on one single object”59 and which the savage does 
not yet have the capacity to conceive of, was easily satisfied.  The conflicts that we associate 
with love were practically nonexistent in this state. 
 Thus, the savage’s ignorance consists in knowing nothing about the complexities of 
capitalistic commerce, of civil society, of our modern array of pleasurable pursuits, or of our 
superfluous language systems.  Yet, Rousseau’s reader may still be concerned to get clearer on 
what the natural state of the savage is not.  He is not referring to the “ferocious and brutal 
ignorance” of the wicked and deceitful who do not know their duties but to a “reasonable sort of 
ignorance.”60  The latter is the type of ignorance that Emile is unashamed of and that limits 
“one’s curiosity to the scope of the faculties one has received”61 and ultimately stems from this 
early innocent ignorance of the savage.  As long as individuals in society stay within such limits, 
society can remain good, because the vain consideration of others’ opinions would not awake 
and, thus, would not motivate corrupted people to spread their corrupting influence.
62
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IV. THE PRAISE OF SOCRATES’ IGNORANCE 
In the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Rousseau praises Socrates for his humble 
sort of ignorance, or his awareness of his ignorance about that which he does not know.
63
  After 
providing an extended quotation of Socrates in the Apology, he states that Socrates is “speaking 
in Praise of ignorance!”64  The type of ignorance to which Rousseau refers here is humble 
ignorance, or humility.  To be conscious of one’s own ignorance is here depicted in opposition to 
believing that one knows something when one does not actually have true knowledge of the 
matter in question. 
 This work argues that Rousseau offers distinct educational approaches for various 
members of society, as well as for various societies, and that he bases the discrepant approaches 
on the moral and intellectual status of the pupil or society in question.  Even scholarly works that 
have been deliberate in distinguishing between the few and the many for Rousseau, such as 
Clifford Orwin’s “Rousseau’s Socratism,” have not done justice to ignorance’s role in moral 
education for Rousseau.  While recognizing that Rousseau’s educational approach is contingent 
upon the pupil or society in question, Orwin is not sufficiently sensitive to the level of corruption 
of the pupil or society in question. 
Scholarship on Rousseau with regard to ignorance’s moral significance has been muddled 
by a failure to adequately define the meaning(s) of ‘ignorance’ for Rousseau.  Orwin, for 
example, discusses Rousseau’s view of ignorance but never provides a clear account of how he is 
interpreting ‘ignorance’ itself in those many passages of Rousseau.  By failing to distinguish 
different types of ignorance, he misidentifies ignorance with misperceptions.  This 
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misidentification results in Orwin concluding that Rousseau is seeking to preserve beneficial 
misperceptions, gaining favor with the people by praising them and not offending them or their 
leaders.  The latter is evidenced for Orwin by the deliberate distortion of Plato’s Socrates from a 
critic of popular opinion to an upholder of it.  Not only is Orwin wrong about his intention here, 
he fails to reconcile his theory with the obvious fact that Rousseau’s Socrates is introduced 
explicitly as praising the humble sort of ignorance, which hardly gives clout to popular opinion 
or misperceptions.  After exploring this paradigmatic example of the misguidance that can result 
from not distinguishing the meanings of ‘ignorance’ when trying to identify its moral 
significance for Rousseau, this chapter will briefly attempt to situate Socrates’ ignorance in its 
proper role in moral education. 
Orwin seems to use ‘ignorance’ in two contradictory ways – a) awareness that one does 
not know, and b) thinking that one knows when one does not.  At one point, Orwin states, “the 
ignorance of the artisans (in thinking that they know what they do not, about the noble and good) 
is more shameful than their knowledge (of their crafts) is resplendent.”65 Yet, he also refers to 
Socrates’ awareness of his lack of knowledge as “ignorance.”66  As is argued throughout the 
present work, one must distinguish between a) the humble sort of ignorance that a true 
philosopher, such as Socrates, possesses, and b) the type of ignorance in which a person lacks 
knowledge and does not have any false conceptions filling those gaps in knowledge.  The 
absence of this distinction in Orwin’s work leads him into error regarding Rousseau’s view of 
ignorance in moral education.   
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Orwin, moreover, misidentifies ‘ignorance’ with misperceptions, while Rousseau 
explicitly warns against such interpretations of his work.   Rousseau might reiterate his 
accusations towards the philosophers to us today, by saying that we “spoke of Savage Man and 
depicted Civil man”67 in our attempts to interpret his theories.  Orwin apparently sees no problem 
in speaking of today’s “popular opinion” as if it were worthy of the label “ignorance,” a 
conflation that is doubly emphasized in Orwin’s claim that Rousseau deliberately distorts 
Socrates in an effort to surreptitiously criticize Plato’s Socrates.68  “Rousseau’s Socrates, by 
contrast, ‘eulogize[s] ignorance,’ that is, defends popular opinion against all pretense to 
knowledge superior to it,” Orwin writes.69  Orwin argues that Rousseau wants us to believe in a 
Socrates whose “working motto is evidently that the examined life is not worth living.”70  This 
might be accurate, if it were the examined life that contained only enough examination to accept 
all the bad influences and opinions of society wholeheartedly and with all the appearance of 
rational assent.  
Orwin argues for this intention of Rousseau by appealing to Rousseau’s deliberate 
distortions of the Platonic Socrates.
71
  Orwin finds it significant that Rousseau, in discussing 
Socrates’ inquiries to various groups purported to be wise in society, first mentions Socrates’ 
turn to the poets, whom Socrates turned to after the statesmen according to the Platonic 
account.
72
  Orwin argues that his omission of the statesmen in the quotation is calculated to avoid 
any criticism of the common people, who vote for the statesmen.
73
  However, it would be out of 
tune with the First Discourse to include an extra paragraph about the politicians.  Moreover, it 
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would have been crass for him to have mentioned the politicians and would have detracted from 
the significance that Rousseau is attributing to human learning (in the Discourse) in the 
corruption of humankind. , because he is here speaking of the minds of “the Learned and the 
Artists,” not of the politicians. 
Rousseau has no quarrels with pointing out the deceitful disposition of politicians when 
such is his subject matter.  One finds him repeatedly warning about the injustice of and 
manipulative tactics of leaders.  While speaking of the general will as the legitimate source of 
authority without any mention of the intrigues that could prevent the general will from being 
achieved would lend one’s writings to totalitarianism, Rousseau deliberately reminds us to doubt 
our leaders and points to manipulation by leaders as an impediment to the general will.  
To begin with Rousseau’s conscious reminders regarding the untrustworthiness of 
political authorities, the chapter entitled “On Monarchy” in Book III of On the Social Contract 
warns repeatedly against corrupt rulers.
74
  Rousseau states unambiguously in this chapter, “When 
a man has been elevated to command others, everything conspires to deprive him of justice and 
reason.”75  Rousseau, invoking Plato’s idea that wise and good kings are few and far between,76 
states that “a king by nature is such a rare person,”77 and that “a royal education necessarily 
corrupts those who receive it.”78  Indeed, for Rousseau, the very problem of politics is “To find a 
form of government that might place the Law above man.
79
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Rousseau also warns about political intrigues and points to manipulation by leaders as an 
impediment to the general will.  In Chapter III of Book II, Rousseau speaks on “our politicians’ 
tricks.”80  In Chapter IV of Book IV, the reader is again reminded of political intrigues.81 
Another instance in which Rousseau seeks to remove external authorities and to return us to the 
internal guidance of natural sentiment is found in the Discourse on Political Economy: “it is not 
uncommon for [the leader] to seek his own happiness in the misery of others.”82  When, 
Rousseau adds, “the people is seduced by private interests which some few skillful men succeed 
by their reputation and eloquence to substitute for the people’s own interest,” “the public 
deliberation will be one thing, and the general will another thing entirely.”83  Rousseau further 
states, “the general will is always for the common good; however quite often there is a secret 
schism, a tacit confederation, which causes the natural disposition of the assembly to be lost 
sight of for the sake of private purposes.”84   
It is absurd, then, to claim, as Orwin does, that Rousseau is “avoiding criticism of the 
people and those vested with its authority”85 in order to somehow win them over and to avoid 
offending the people.  Orwin might object that we must look to the First Discourse itself to see 
how Rousseau wishes to speak to the ordinary reader.  However, even if Rousseau had not 
written any other works by means of which we could place the First Discourse in a broader 
context, Rousseau’s account of Socrates should not lead us to Orwin’s conclusion about 
Rousseau on ignorance.  For one, Rousseau does not use language that would deceitfully suggest 
that Socrates spoke first to the poets and never to the statesmen.  It would be unusual for us to 
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expect that Rousseau quote the entire Apology of Socrates; Rousseau quotes only the portion that 
is relevant to his topic.   
Orwin claims that “Rousseau is guilty of distortions of…commission” as well; 
Rousseau’s Socrates questions the artists, whereas Plato’s Socrates questions the artisans.  For 
Orwin, this signifies another distortion of Plato’s Socrates (i.e., the annoying gadfly who instills 
doubt in his interlocutors and elicits the contempt of his fellow citizens) in service of an appeal 
to the common man.  Yet, Orwin himself admits in a footnote that “It is quite possible that 
[Rousseau] did not…know Greek” and “that his reinterpretation of Plato rests to this extent on an 
innocent error.”86  The rendering of cheirotechnai as artistes rather than artisans in Diderot’s 
translation of the Apology seems more likely to be the cause of Rousseau’s use of “artists” rather 
than “artisans,” given that Diderot was one of Rousseau’s closest friends at the time.87 
In the process of developing reasons for Rousseau’s distortions of Plato’s Socrates, 
Orwin loses sight of the main point that Rousseau explicitly conveys by invoking Socrates.  
Rousseau tells us that Socrates is wise and virtuous for declaring that he knows that he does not 
know.  Rousseau’s Socrates states that his wisdom consists in being “fully convinced that I am 
ignorant of what I do not know.”88  Socrates displays humility, as he is aware that he does not 
possess knowledge of the things that he does not possess knowledge about and admits this fact.  
This humble sort of ignorance is quintessentially Socratic and is the overarching point of the 
passages that Rousseau quotes from Plato’s Apology. 
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Returning to the issue at hand, then, Rousseau’s purported distortion of Socrates is not an 
attempt to gain populistic favor
89
 in order to place Rousseau and other philosophers in a position 
to provide moral teachings to society, even if those teachings somehow reinforce the people’s 
own opinions on virtue.
90
  While ignorance can, in a sense, be a virtue for Rousseau, 
misperceptions are the substance of the corruption that Rousseau is truly seeking to prevent.  By 
conflating ignorance with misperception, Orwin cannot capture one of the most important 
contributions of Rousseau to moral thought, that ignorance of a certain kind is good for both the 
true philosopher and the average person, while the benefits of ignorance of another kind are 
contingent upon various factors that must be considered in the individual or society. 
Orwin, however, makes no systematic distinction between the uncorrupted and corrupted 
individual or society whatsoever.  Without this distinction, upon which I will elaborate in 
Chapter VIII, one cannot not begin to piece apart the complex system for which Rousseau only 
plants the seeds in the First Discourse.  It is only for the corrupted individual or society that the 
wise philosopher must interfere with the moral conceptions of the average person.  An 
uncorrupted individual who has retained natural sentiment is still in touch with the knowledge of 
virtue that is “engraved in all hearts”91 and is not in need of any moral instruction from the wise.  
As man is naturally good, man does not need guidance by the various philosophies of others to 
better arrive at moral action; man’s inner light, his natural sentiment led by reason, is the most 
reliable source of guidance towards virtue.  Arguing that the common person needs to be guided 
by wise and true philosophers is to presuppose that philosophy would benefit them in some way, 
but, if we are to accept my interpretation of Rousseau as claiming that there are those for whom 
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philosophy would corrupt their souls, then philosophy should be kept as far as possible from 
such uncorrupted individuals.  Apart from Socrates and other true philosophers who are morally 
impervious to the potential dangers to be found in the great and difficult task of fully 
systematizing our morals, it is the corrupted who need philosophy.  Moreover, as Socrates’ 
humble form of ignorance is definitional of philosophy for Rousseau, this conscious acceptance 
of one’s ignorance is to be encouraged only insofar as one is capable of retaining natural 
goodness, or for corrupted individuals or societies. 
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V. THE PRAISE OF IGNORANCE IN MODERN MAN: OUR NATURAL CONNECTION TO 
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY 
Not only do Socrates and the savage possess virtuous forms of ignorance, but the moral 
character of a modern man (who is not one “of the few privileged souls”)92 can also benefit from 
ignorance.    While Socrates’ humility is beneficial in its conscious acceptance of the fact that 
there are many important matters about which he does not possess knowledge, the form of 
ignorance that is common to all of us from birth is the actual absence of knowledge and the lack 
of any misconceptions in the place of this knowledge gap.  This type of ignorance has two 
components – a) the natural tendency of the mind to attempt judgment only on what is within the 
scope of its faculties at any given time, and b) the actual absence of knowledge.  The first 
component relates to the latter by serving as the means to intuitively determining what requires 
or deserves the preservation of this innate absence of knowledge and what is within the mind’s 
reach and is necessary to learn about.  As will be further explored in this chapter, natural 
sentiment, with the aide of humanity’s innate curiosity, makes such determinations naturally 
until corrupted by external forces and influences.  Together, the two components of this type of 
ignorance appear to be the foundation from which the individual develops conscious acceptance 
of one’s ignorance, which is the epitome of the humble sort of ignorance. 
Rousseau maintains that it is preferable for an individual to remain ignorant about a 
matter until the individual is in a position to understand the matter properly.  Ignorance that is 
undisturbed by premature or misconceived notions lends itself to decisions based on natural 
sentiment, which leads us to our good and is discussed in this chapter.  Rousseau holds that the 
misconceptions that would likely arise from presenting ideas to a person before he is able to 
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conceive them properly can be morally corrupting, and that the individual would be better off in 
his naturally ignorant state until his natural curiosity and his mental development are in tune with 
exposure to the ideas in question, as Chapter VI explains.  With regard to modern men, Rousseau 
praises ignorance for its conduciveness to clarity of mind, as is discussed in Chapter VII. 
In his chapter entitled “Ignorance” in Rousseau’s Critique of Science: A Commentary on 
the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts, Jeff J.S. Black penetrates Rousseau’s discussion of 
ignorance more carefully than Orwin and does attempt to distinguish Rousseau’s different 
meanings of the term ‘ignorance.’  Black appears to make a rigorous effort to systematize the 
topic of ignorance in Rousseau.  He identifies two main kinds of ignorance.
93
  However, Black’s 
attempt to systematically treat the topic of ignorance in Rousseau’s thought seems to go no 
further than to separate the two types of ignorance that Orwin conflates.  One of Black’s two 
main kinds of ignorance is the ignorance of the wise, which is Socrates’ praise of ignorance, or 
knowledge of one’s own ignorance.  “To be precise, Rousseau’s Socrates praises self-conscious 
ignorance over false claims to knowledge,” Black writes.94  Awareness that one does not know 
is, of course, one way in which Orwin uses the term ‘ignorance.’   
Black’s other main kind of ignorance is popular ignorance, which consists of “opinions or 
sentiments about the true, the good, and the beautiful that provide moral purity.”95  The most 
illustrious incarnation of this type of ignorance is in the form of heroic ignorance, which is 
attributable to Cato, Fabricius, and others of heroic stature.  Black explains, “from the 
perspective of wise ignorance, the aspirations of heroes like Cato and Fabricius” are “based on 
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opinions that are half true at best, and ultimately self-destructive.”96  Black takes heroic 
ignorance to be that which scorns the sciences and the arts specifically as an impediment to 
patriotism and military duties.  Thus, according to Black, the most that the possessor of wise 
ignorance can hope for in his fellow citizens is belief in half-truths that do not even lead to the 
good. 
In his chapter, Black explains that this form of ignorance among the populace is 
important for patriotism and military virtues.  He writes, “Rousseau’s correction of Plato’s 
Socrates is better understood, then, not as a defense of a particular republic, nor even as a 
defense of republicanism in general, but as a general defense of the underpinnings of moral 
purity: the opinions, expressed by citizens and their leaders, that provide support for virtue, 
patriotism, and piety.”97 Black states clearly here that the opinions of the public are the source of 
“moral purity,” despite Black’s own admission that Rousseau, like Socrates, would have 
believed the Thirty Tyrants (Socrates’ contemporary regime) to be a corrupt regime.98  Black is 
suggesting that Rousseau’s refusal to put a critique of the contemporary regime into Socrates’ 
mouth is actually an indication that such a view would undermine “the opinions…that provide 
support for virtue, patriotism and piety.”99 
The praise of ignorance in modern man, then, becomes not an acknowledgement of the 
worth of our natural dispositions and connections to the good but a nod to the need for a 
courageous, patriotic citizenry.  Popular ignorance, then, consists merely of opinions that are not 
infrequently misperceptions.  It is characterized by beliefs that are not necessarily true, or, in 
other words, Black uses the term ‘ignorance’ here to refer to instances of thinking that one 
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knows when one does not.  Having made the distinction between popular ignorance and the 
ignorance of the wise, Black has delivered us from Orwin’s obfuscation, but we are still left 
without mention of the key type of ignorance that Rousseau defends throughout the Emile – 
ignorance as the absence of both knowledge and any misconceptions in the place of the 
knowledge gap. 
Before criticizing one of the main forms of ignorance that he believes Rousseau to be 
praising, I will, for the sake of full disclosure, make mention of the other forms of ignorance that 
he identifies.  Black argues that “there are two additional kinds of ignorance that may be found in 
the background of this argument.  The first is savage ignorance,” which I have considered in 
Chapter III.  The other kind of ignorance is “criminal ignorance,”100 for which Black refers us to 
Rousseau’s elucidating passage in the “Observations.”101  This is an ignorance in which 
falsehoods abound and feed the corrupted man’s evil desires and increasingly “degrades reason” 
and “debases the soul.”102  For my part, I did not include this type as one of Rousseau’s forms of 
ignorance, as he does not praise it.  In fact, it is explicitly condemned and used as a contrast to 
the type that he praised.  In the quoted passage from the “Observations,” Rousseau uses the term 
ignorance in response to King Stanislaus, who had himself depicted a form of ignorance that 
contained brutal and uncouth qualities.  In his response, Rousseau seems to acknowledge that it 
is one way in which the word can be used, only to declare unequivocally that he is not referring 
to such a type of ignorance.  Black inadvertently seems to verify this when he equates this 
“criminal ignorance” with the “condition worse than ignorance,”103 which is mentioned at the 
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beginning of the First Discourse.  If the state is worse than that of ignorance, then it appears not 
to be the state of ignorance itself. 
Thus, while the effort to make more accessible Rousseau’s system as it regards the topic 
of ignorance is admirable, Black’s picture includes a form of ignorance that (like Orwin’s) 
contains false convictions (which will be criticized further in Chapter VI) and excludes the form 
of ignorance that emphasizes the goodness of our natural tendencies, which the absence of 
knowledge and misconceptions can keep alive and potent.  I will now argue that the praise of 
ignorance in modern man, or man who has stepped out of the state of nature, by Rousseau is not 
of popular or heroic ignorance (as described by Black) but of ignorance in the sense of not 
knowing and also of not having any misconceptions in the place of the knowledge gap. 
 The combination of, or the interplay of, our two natural sentiments, amour de soi
104
 and 
pity,
105
 produces a natural sentiment, or feeling, that guides our beliefs and actions.
106
  The 
product of the interplay of amour de soi and of pity, then, is natural sentiment, which leads us to 
our good.  As reason, which also ultimately guides natural sentiment to the good, is not fully 
developed in childhood, incorporation of reason into Rousseau’s theory of the soul will be 
explored after Rousseau’s understanding of our nature in childhood has been presented. 
While Bertram argues that there are “two natures”107 in Rousseau’s account, there are, in 
a sense, two natures in modern man alone.  Children do not yet possess the faculty of reason.  As 
should be plain by Emile’s use of speech and constant contact with human beings, even the child 
Emile is beyond the naturalness of the savage in the state of nature.  With the development of 
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reason at the age of fifteen, the human being can arguably be said to acquire a nature that it could 
not previously access.  In other words, reason adds a key factor to our psychology after we have 
passed through childhood. A key problem that Rousseau solves in the Emile is to avoid the 
assumption that children have fully acquired the nature of the second type, that of “rational 
creatures;”108 children should only gradually be treated as adult human beings and only in 
proportion to the development of their reason.  Thus, I will treat the case of children here first 
and will then incorporate the missing factors – reason and the accompanying passions – into the 
discussion of the adult human’s soul. 
The passion of amour de soi is always with the child and, despite any appearances to the 
contrary, cannot be said to ever truly leave the human soul.
109
  Unaided for the most part by the 
faculty of reason, the age of which does not arrive until around fifteen,
110
 the child’s 
psychological make-up is simple, because the extent of the child’s thinking is limited by his 
“immediate and palpable interest.”111  As the child is only concerned with his own preservation 
and other interests
112
 but lacks the ability to reason, the child lives only in the present moment 
and is driven by the survival instinct within the framework of what is accessible to the child’s 
mind in the fleeting moment.
113
 
However, an understanding of Rousseau’s use of the term ‘reason’ is necessary for 
recognizing the difference between the faculty of reason and the ostensibly rational drive for 
self-preservation; as Rousseau himself states, “I am, however, very far from thinking that 
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children have no kind of reasoning.”114 The problem lies in “the poverty of our language.”115  
“There is no language rich enough to furnish as many terms, turns, and phrases as our ideas can 
have modifications,” he writes.116  Despite this predicament, Rousseau attempts to attain clarity 
by “arranging it so that as often as each word is used, the meaning given it be sufficiently 
determined by the ideas related to it and that each period where the word is found serves it, so to 
speak, as a definition.”117 In other words, he believes that clarity can be achieved if the word in 
question is recognized across the related contexts in which the user employs it. 
Moreover, reason must be distinguished from knowledge.  In his chapter “Dare to Be 
Ignorant!” in Rousseau’s Counter-Enlightenment, Graeme Garrard conflates reason with 
knowledge, attributing to Rousseau the same contempt for reason that he is generally claimed to 
have for knowledge.  “As with philosophy, in other words, reason is socially destructive,” he 
writes.
118
  He continues, “Rousseau thought of reason as a very weak and unreliable faculty.”119  
Not only does Garrard provide an unedifying account of Rousseau’s quibble with knowledge, he 
profanes reason in the process of trying to explain Rousseau’s praise of ignorance.  He offers as 
evidence the following passage from the Emile: “[r]eason alone is not active; sometimes it 
restrains, rarely it excites, and it never did anything noble.”120  However, the passage is 
highlighting the faultiness of attempting to employ reason without any regard to sentiment.  It 
might not be surprising to us if the attempt to silence sentiment in favor of reason results in 
nothing better than the moral compass of a computer. Thus, the reasoning faculty “alone” may 
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not lead to noble deeds, but such a claim is far from condemning the use of reason in a normal 
human being (who would possess sentiment).   
Even more boldly and forthrightly than Black, Garrard attributes to Rousseau a 
preference for the virtues of Cato, while now acknowledging that Rousseau is sympathetic to the 
reasonable virtues of Socrates.  “Despite his admiration for the prototypical philosopher 
Socrates…Rousseau preferred Cato,” who Garrard describes as the exemplary patriot.121  Given 
Garrard’s earlier statements about the opposition between reason or knowledge and virtue, it is 
bizarre that Garrard does not take this opportunity to clarify Rousseau’s paradox in any way.  To 
make such a sweeping statement about the superiority of the citizen and inferiority of (yet 
somehow admirable philosophical qualities of) Socrates seems even absurd.  As this thesis 
argues more forcefully in Chapter VIII, whether one should be educated to pursue the virtues 
epitomized in Socrates or those of Cato
122
 depends on one’s capacities and tendencies, as well as 
one’s level of moral corruption.  Rousseau does not believe that Cato is more virtuous than 
Socrates in some absolute sense, as Garrard upholds; rather, both are examples of virtuous 
character for different reasons.  Additionally, reason is invoked and praised by Rousseau (even in 
the First Discourse)
123
 and is not to be conflated with knowledge in his criticism of the latter.  If 
he sincerely held reason to be a menace to society and a detriment to our morals, then the 
“reasonable sort of ignorance”124 would be an oxymoronic statement for him. 
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When Rousseau speaks of the age of reason, he understands the term ‘reason’ to refer to 
the relations among abstract concepts and to the logic used to derive abstract rules.
125
  The rules 
of geometry, for example, are not within the reach of children, who only learn the sense 
impressions of shapes and associate them with their geometrical formulas; children do not truly 
grasp the abstract concepts that form the basis of geometry, according to Rousseau.
126
  
The reasoning that occurs in childhood is, although minimal, related to our present and 
tangible interest.
127
  Rousseau states, “I see that they reason very well in everything they know 
that relates to their immediate and palpable interest.”128  This suggests that children have some 
reasoning abilities, but that they are able to use them properly only when they find the need to 
use it for their survival or other interest. 
Morality develops with the development of reason.
129
  Far from discrediting reason along 
with his critique of knowledge and learning, then, Rousseau maintains that reason gives birth to 
morality.  Garrard, who concedes this point regarding the source of morality, might still object 
that the application of reason is, on the whole, more pernicious than would be the absence of 
reason.
130
  However, Garrard misunderstands what it means for morality to be born with reason.  
Reason gives us the capacity for morality and is the tool that must be used to make worthy moral 
judgments as a human being.  False knowledge, vanity, and other means of corruption are what 
ruin this reasoning process.  Reason cannot be blamed (and is not blamed by Rousseau) for the 
misgivings of misperceptions.  It is corruption that leads us into sophisms.   
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Importantly, children cannot yet conceive properly of morality.
131
  As a natural child will 
seek to preserve himself but is not yet in a position to feel capable of caring for others, the child 
instinctually seeks only his own good.  The good of others can only be a concern once reason has 
provided the ability to think of oneself as a moral being
132
 and once the human being can 
function based on reasoning instead of solely on “the most basic drive,”133 that for self-
preservation.  The fact that children are naturally amoral will play an important role in Emile’s 
education and in the prescriptions regarding education to society at large. 
With the development of reason, the human being can arguably be said to acquire a part 
of its nature that had previously been latent.  As was partly described in the earlier discussion on 
the goodness of man, amour-propre develops out of amour de soi due to the development of 
reason.  Rousseau explains regarding the two natural types of love: 
The sole passion natural to man is amour de soi or amour-propre taken in an extended sense.  
This amour-propre in itself or relative to us is good and useful; and since it has no necessary 
relation to others, it is in this respect naturally neutral.  It becomes good or bad only by the 
application made of it and the relations given to it.
134
 
Amour-propre, or the source of the passions that are able to develop with the onset of reason,
135
 
is natural in the sense that it inevitably develops in a human being who lives in society,
136
 and 
the use we make of it renders it either good or bad.
137
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Rousseau further elucidates his understanding of amour de soi and of amour-propre:  
But would it be reasoning well to conclude, from the fact that it is in man’s nature to have 
passions, that all the passions we feel in ourselves and see in others are natural? Their source 
is natural, it is true.  But countless alien streams have swollen it.
138
 
Their natural source is amour de soi, but the external influences can cause amour de soi to 
transform into corrupted types of amour-propre, or passions that are unnatural.  This double 
capacity of amour-propre signifies that passions can be either natural or unnatural, either good or 
bad.  When they follow amour de soi, our passions are natural.
139
  When passions do not relate to 
our true good, they are unnatural.
140
 
Joshua Cohen insightfully argues that amour-propre encompasses the concern for one’s 
“standing in the eyes of others,” whereas amour de soi only considers whether one is good or 
worthy of love in oneself, regardless of how one compares to other human beings.
141
  Amour-
propre allows us to compare ourselves to others.
142
  When it causes us to prefer ourselves to 
others, it brings about “hateful and irascible passions.”143  There is a host of passions that 
depends upon one “preferring ourselves to others”144 and upon a relative comparison that does 
not truly contribute to our good.
145
  These passions seek perception of oneself not as objectively 
well-off but as well-off relative to other human beings,
146
 and such a desire leads to the desire to 
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have others view us as better than themselves as well.
147
  Therefore, these passions encompass 
pride, resentment, and vanity.
148
 
Jeff Black interprets Rousseau to be attributing to amour-propre only the latter, ignoble 
type of passions.  He states that amour-propre is “a passion…that leads human beings to esteem 
themselves more highly than others, and to demand that others agree with their judgment.”149  At 
most, Black recognizes the variation in bad types of amour-propre.  “Rousseau…distinguishes 
between pride [orgueil] and vanity [vanité], understood as two types of amour-propre.”150 
However, comparisons can be derived from good passions as well, when the comparisons 
are not driven by the vain desire to view ourselves as better than others.
151
  While amour-propre 
includes more than just the naturally good sentiment of amour de soi, which does not seek any 
reference to one’s worth in relation to others, amour-propre can lead to our good when the 
comparisons that it sparks are not grounded in any form of vanity or any sense of superiority, as 
Cohen affirms.
152
  When one follows one’s true good, one’s amour-propre is in accord with 
one’s original amour de soi, and amour-propre in such a case makes us content “when our true 
needs are satisfied.”153  Pity is the first natural passion that considers ourselves relative to others.  
Another important aspect of amour-propre, which would be lost if the complexity of our 
analysis only extended as far as Black’s distinctions for bad amour-propre, is that the good, or 
noble, manifestations of amour-propre are good to varying degrees.  Beginning his Letter to 
Franquieres with an explanation of why it took so long for him to reply, Rousseau states, “my 
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humbled amour propre made you wait such a long time, because I failed to sense that a much 
nobler amour propre should have taught me to overcome the first.”154  This statement clearly 
implies that not all acts driven by amour-propre are equal, and also that it is, contingent upon the 
goodness of the amour-propre that is experienced, virtuous to act according to our amour-propre 
now that we are living in society without hope of return to our animal-human, or savage, life 
consisting solely of amour de soi.  Amour-propre, Rousseau obviously implies, can guide us to 
noble actions, some more noble than others. 
Other than pity, another key passion that is natural and good is the sincere desire for 
deserved honor.  This is the most significant noble passion for Rousseau. As Rousseau states in 
Note XV of the Second Discourse, amour-propre “is the true source of honor.”155  Rousseau 
consistently holds honor, when it is deserved and is bestowed guilelessly, a good and natural part 
of social life.
156
  Morals and customs are often observed due to the sense of honor or of disgrace 
that would result if one abided by or neglected them, respectively.  Similarly the practices that 
are not compatible with a society’s moeurs157 are often avoided out of concern for honor and due 
to the uncomfortable nature of disgrace.  These phenomena can be either calculating or honest; 
one can seek a reputation that one does not deserve in order to be preferred by the public, and 
this, in turn, could lead to personal gain.
158
  This calculated concern for honor is less the passion 
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for honor than the recognition, through one’s reasoning faculty, that honor can be materially 
beneficial.
159
             
Rousseau argues that the government should find in honor and in disgrace the most 
effective means for correcting moeurs in accordance with the standard of public utility.
160
  The 
means to correcting customs and mores should never be found in the use of “corporeal 
punishment,”161 prisons, arrests, or armed guards.162  While honor requires, out of absolute 
necessity, the comparison of two or more persons, the implication appears to be that honor is 
good and noble when the activity for which one receives the honor is itself good, such as the 
modest conduct of a girl at a public ball.
163
  To offer another example, Rousseau seeks the honor 
that can be attained from the proper perception of his views on the subject of the theater, the 
views that a good man should possess.
164
  In short, the community benefits from individuals who 
justly seek honor for the good that they perform. 
 Natural sentiment, which is a product of the interactions between amour de soi and pity, 
leads to our good and is an integral argument in favor of ignorance for Rousseau.  With the help 
of our innate curiosity, natural sentiment makes the beneficial task of remaining within the scope 
of our faculties a natural one.  As goodness is our natural state, knowledge (or, really, the 
appearance of knowledge) can corrupt us.    Amour de soi, pity, and the sincere desire for 
deserved honor are all beneficial to the individual and to society, and ignorance leaves these 
sentiments intact and enables the proper source of motivation, natural sentiment, to function as 
was naturally intended. 
                                                          
159
 Rousseau.  “Letter to d’Offreville,” 261-262. 
160
 Rousseau.  Letter to d’Alembert, 67-68. 
161
 Ibid., 68. 
162
 Ibid., 68. 
163
 Ibid., 130. 
164
 Ibid., 6. 
38 
 
IV. THE PRAISE OF IGNORANCE IN MODERN MAN:                                           
IGNORANCE VS. FALSE CONVICTIONS  
The preservation of ignorance is also crucially beneficial as a protection against the 
dangers of false convictions.  As discussed in the previous chapter, children do not possess the 
faculty of reason until around the age of fifteen.
165
  Rousseau describes the negative effects of 
the era’s conventional practices in education, in which parents would blithely seek to reason with 
their children
166
 and to have them, for example, understand the actions of figures from history.
167
  
Exempting child prodigies from his critique,
168
 Rousseau argues that we do not reach the age of 
reason in childhood.
169
  Not having sufficiently developed their reasoning abilities, children, 
according to Rousseau, usually either misinterpret their parents’ proffered reasons as being the 
cloak of ill will
170
 or misapprehend the concepts of instruction, even when they have learned 
words for their image-based perceptions of those concepts
171
.  For Rousseau, to prematurely 
educate a child in reason is akin to misinforming the child,
172
 which is worse than leaving the 
child ignorant.
173
 
Apart from chiding parents for forcing upon their innocent children a “barbarous 
education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which burdens a child with chains 
of every sort and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from afar for I know 
not what pretended happiness,”174 Rousseau criticizes this education for its poor educational 
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benefit and quality; the latter criticism can be further divided into disapproval of not only the 
intellectual quality but the moral quality of the education.  Greek and Latin, for example, are not 
useful to children’s everyday existence, except for vain displays of erudition to people who 
themselves know no better,
175
 which is itself a corrupt and corrupting practice that should be 
avoided.  Moreover, as children hardly have the ability to comprehend a single language fully, to 
teach them another language is to teach them only synonyms.
176
  As the comprehension of two 
different languages would presuppose the use of reason, “[Children] will never know any but 
one.”177  
In the example pertaining to the study of languages, Rousseau is defining reason as the 
ability to compare ideas.  To know two languages, the child “would have to know how to 
compare ideas, and how could he compare them when he is hardly in a condition to conceive 
them?”178  To recognize the signs used to signify something is not the same as to grasp the actual 
concepts that those signs or symbols signify.  One can know the signs without comprehension, 
and one also can comprehend an idea without knowing one of its particular signs (e.g. a word 
written in another language).  A child cannot truly understand many ideas, and a child at this 
stage of development should not be learning their respective words in six different languages.  
Children are not prepared for the study of history, either. Rousseau tells of a dinner at an 
aristocratic family’s house in the countryside; the child, who has been instructed in ancient 
history and who receives praises for fine regurgitations of previous lessons, is asked to speak on 
the courage of Alexander the Great.
179
  “After the dinner, suspecting, on the basis of several bits 
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of evidence, that my young doctor had understood nothing at all of the story he had told so 
well,”180 Rousseau went for a walk with the pupil and asked about Alexander’s courage.181  The 
child had believed Alexander to be courageous for “having swallowed at a single gulp a bad-
tasting potion, without hesitation, without the least sign of repugnance.”182  The aftertaste of a 
medicine that the child had taken weeks earlier had made the child quite averse to such poisons.   
Perhaps, parents might object, this inability of children to fully comprehend geometry, 
geology, languages, history, and heraldry is precisely the reason for beginning their education 
with the terminology of these fields; having spent their childhood learning these terms, children 
will passively grasp the abstract concepts behind these terms and will make the necessary mental 
connections when they come of age, while saving them great efforts to learn this wealth of terms 
in the future.  Put another way, proponents of the traditional education might dismiss the 
prospect of any danger in the conceptions that children make of notions that ultimately require 
the faculty of reason to understand fully, arguing instead for the efficacy of their approach over 
that of Jean-Jacques. 
Rousseau exhorts us to consider the ill effects of misconceptions.
183
  He explains the ease 
with which we use words as if they have no meaning.  “It is not the term he uses which is 
important to me but rather the meaning he gives to it,” Rousseau explains.184  Children do not 
understand what ‘please’ and other “vain formulas of politeness” mean;185 they only understand 
that using them can get them what they feel that they immediately need or want.
186
  Acquiring an 
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early conception of “I please” that merely means “I order you”187 prevents the child from 
understanding the concepts of please and of politeness.  Rousseau decries, “what dangerous 
prejudices does one not begin to inspire in them by making them take for science words which 
have no sense for them?”188 
 By forcing the intellectual world on a child before he is ready for it, “you may be sure 
that he will [. . .] get fantastic notions of the moral world of which you speak to him, notions that 
you will never in your life be able to blot out.”189  Children are largely amoral, in that they 
cannot grasp moral notions well enough to put them into practice based on their goodness.  
“Before the age of reason one cannot have any idea of moral beings or of social relations,” 
Rousseau declares.
190
  Thus, imposing the study of morality onto the child puts ill-conceived 
notions into his or her mind, whereas the child would have been able to comprehend morality 
quite aptly if he or she were left to develop those notions individually.  This educational practice 
results in children becoming manipulative and vain,
191
 as well as “dissemblers, fakers, and 
liars.”192 
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VII. THE PRAISE OF IGNORANCE IN MODERN MAN: IGNORANCE AS CONDUCIVE 
TO CLARITY OF MIND 
Another benefit of ignorance for Rousseau is its conduciveness to clarity of mind.  In the 
Emile, Rousseau argues that “peasants generally have clearer minds than city people,”193 because 
“their lexicon is less extensive.  They have few ideas, but they are very good at the comparison 
of ideas.”194  The never-ending stream of opinions that one encounters in a big city and at the 
theater serve to confuse the mind regarding the important things that would otherwise be clear to 
even a simple villager, according to Rousseau.  He is suggesting that the human mind is better 
able to reason abstractly (i.e., to compare ideas) when it has words only for ideas that it can 
understand and when it has only one word for each idea.  As Rousseau makes clear in the Essay 
on the Origin of Languages, words are used to represent ideas.
195
  While the use of words is 
intended to help us access our ideas, an excess of words makes access to the idea(s) that one 
seeks to convey (whether to others or to oneself) more difficult.  At each instance in which one 
has more than one word for the same idea, the human mind would have to make a decision about 
which word to use amongst the various synonyms.   
Learning, or the sciences and the arts, can also weigh negatively on judgment, because 
Rousseau holds that clear and reasonable thought prevails more easily in the absence of an 
abundance of opinions.
196
  When the mind is overburdened by a plethora of opinions, the 
important points about the matter at hand may not be able to stay afloat, rendering one’s 
judgment less reasonable.  He writes, “the human mind, less spread out, less drowned in vulgar 
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opinions, elaborates itself and ferments better in tranquil solitude.”197  A wealth of opinions can 
distract from the inner natural inclination to reason for oneself without vain considerations of 
others’ opinions.   
 Moreover, the answers to the greatest questions of life are accessed easily by a mind that 
does not overburden itself with complex explanations of how things work or with convoluted 
systems of thought.  As natural sentiment guides us to the ideas and topics that are most 
important for us to know, and as the basic principles of morality are intuited by us all,
198
 the 
more we fill our minds with nuanced material that nevertheless fails to propel us toward our 
good, the more we create a burden for ourselves that did not naturally exist.  We were prepared 
to answer the important questions prior to being inundated with others’ ideas and viewpoints, 
yet, according to Rousseau, the path that we set ourselves on sometimes ironically takes us 
further and further away from the sentiment with which we initially sought to answer life’s 
important questions.   
Rousseau gives us, as an example, the contrast between the philosopher and the 
plowman.   The philosopher, who thinks that he knows the secrets of the world, “prescribes laws 
to nature and limits to the Divinity.”199  In an attempt to promote his self-worth in the name of 
clarifying the arrangement of the world’s systems, the philosopher finds limitations or faults in 
the workings of the Creator.  The philosopher undermines moral duty “on pretext of elucidating 
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its principles.”200 Philosophers and scholars, in other words, destroy our natural clarity of thought 
and its orientation towards moral duty and moral truths. 
The plowman, on the other hand, “who sees the rain and the sun by turns fertilize his 
field admires, praises and blesses the hand from which he receives these graces, without 
troubling himself about how they come to him.”201  In other words, the plowman, who is content 
to disregard the forbidden fruit’s call to knowledge of God’s secrets, recognizes the obvious 
blessing that has been bestowed upon human beings through the incredible processes of our 
world, without needing to know exactly how those processes work in order to give praise to their 
benefactor.  According to Rousseau, the praise that is due to the Creator is just one moral truth 
whose importance is unfathomed by the philosopher who seeks to “justify his ignorance or his 
vices” by committing himself to study and who increasingly loses clarity of mind.202 The 
plowman’s clarity of mind reveals the obvious truths of the world, whereas the corrupted mind 
may no longer have access to such clear indications. 
One might object that clarity of mind is a merely a clever way to formulate the absence of 
knowledge.  On this account, Rousseau is discouraging us from obtaining necessary or useful 
knowledge via a euphemistic representation of the state of ignorance.  While it may be true that 
Rousseau is not encouraging tutors to teach us the opinions of others in society or to fill their 
pupils’ minds with vain items of information, he is also not encouraging us to maintain empty 
minds that possess knowledge of nothing.  As we have seen, Rousseau argues that it can be good 
to possess knowledge of our ignorance, knowledge of our political leaders and systems, and 
useful knowledge of math, agriculture, and other topics that Emile is taught (or self-taught).  
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Rousseau would have given leave of all sense if he were to claim that we should be equipped 
with knowledge of nothing at all in life.
203
 
By maintaining our connections to natural sentiment and to the basic principles of 
morality, we retain our clarity of mind.  By overburdening ourselves with others’ opinions and 
viewpoints, or by filling our minds with a host of ideas that engage us in debates on frivolous 
matters or that simply give us more information than we can sort out, we find difficulty in 
focusing on the most important matters, which are obvious to the mind that only accesses 
knowledge of those things and knows nothing of superfluous matters. 
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VIII. THE CONTINGENCY OF ROUSSEAU’S APPROACH TO MORAL EDUCATION 
UPON THE PUPIL OR SOCIETY  
The First Discourse levels an attack against the arts and the sciences for corrupting men’s 
morals.  L’Académie de Dijon’s 1750 Prize Essay Competition, which Rousseau had won, had 
asked “Has the Restoration of the Sciences and Arts Contributed to the Purification of 
Morals?”204 The proposed question suggested that morals had been purified within recent 
history, and that there was uncertainty about whether the sciences and the arts were the cause of 
this purification;
205
 Rousseau added an alternative proposal, namely, that the arts and the 
sciences had led to their corruption.
206
  While this theme recurs throughout Rousseau’s works, it 
is most poignant in the First Discourse and in the Letter to D’Alembert on the Theater.  Once 
one has conceded to Rousseau that the arts and sciences lead society as a whole to vanity, to 
profligacy, and to weak morals, Rousseau will grant that science can lead to human convenience 
and that philosophy can discover the truth of the world.
207
  Rousseau’s intention in these harsh 
criticisms of philosophers and of learning, though, is to enfeeble society’s corrupting forces.208  
Moreover, a society that has preserved its natural sentiment and has not been given over to the 
corrupt passions would be better off without the arts,
209
 whereas a bad society can benefit from 
the mental distractions that the arts and the sciences provide.
210
  In addition, an educator should 
promote philosophy, the arts, and the sciences at the individual level when the person in question 
would not be corrupted by their pursuit. 
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Rousseau’s purpose in showing the dangers of the arts and the sciences is to slow the 
corruption of society.  By showing their dangers, he is, in one regard, simply warning us not to 
pursue the arts and the sciences so eagerly.  In a clear indication that he considers himself to be 
mitigating or slowing the corruption of society, Rousseau states, “Since the state of society thus 
has an ultimate limit which men have it in their power to reach either sooner or later, it is not 
useless to show them the danger of going so fast.”211   
To attain his purpose, Rousseau does not merely warn the reader; another method that 
Rousseau employs in the First Discourse in particular is to return the reader to natural sentiment 
by developing a disdain for vanity, affected politeness, and other forms of dissimulation, which 
are unnatural to us, as well as an appreciation of virtue and of service to others in the community 
or the state.  In doing so, Rousseau is ultimately attempting to break the bad connections that we 
have to others while moving us toward the good connections that we could possess.  Rousseau 
writes, “Before art had fashioned our manners and taught our passions to speak an affected 
language, our mores were rustic but natural.”212  In other words, Rousseau advises us to 
remember the time prior to the sprouting of bad and unnatural passions.  Rousseau seeks to instill 
repugnance to the fake society that we find ourselves in and to reorient our thinking to the true 
nature of humanity.  Rousseau further declares, “Without ceasing, politeness makes demands, 
propriety gives orders; without ceasing, common customs are followed, never one’s own lights.  
One no longer dares to seem what one really is.”213  Rousseau paints fake politeness and the vain 
concern for others’ opinions as the forces that corrupt natural sentiment.  In contemporary 
society, one does not listen to inner sentiment but to the false passions, such as vanity. 
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By concomitantly praising virtue, or service to the community and the state,
214
 Rousseau 
circumvents encouragement of the practices of half-philosophers, who become independent-
minded only by despising others, by feeding their own arrogance, and by detaching themselves 
from any duties to others.
215
  As the final paragraph of the First Discourse cries, “O virtue! [. . .] 
Are your principles not engraved in all hearts, and is it not enough, in order to learn your laws, to 
commune with oneself and, in the silence of the passions, to listen to the voice of one’s 
conscience?”216  Rousseau returns the reader to natural sentiment by reviving in him the 
confidence to believe in the moral law that he once submitted to willingly and that has not 
completely been erased from his heart. 
To know whether such warnings and attempts to return the reader to natural sentiment are 
efficient or even effective, however, one must both be aware of his distinction between the few 
and many and grasp his understanding of the various types of ignorance.  Black writes, “In this 
way – almost silently, as it were – Rousseau introduces a fundamental distinction into his 
argument.”217  For Black, who believes he has keenly picked up on Rousseau’s distinction 
between the few and the many, the distinctions among different types of ignorance that receive 
Rousseau’s praise still remain partly elusive, as was discussed in Chapter V.  However, to 
distinguish between the few and the many while identifying two unrevealing types of 
praiseworthy ignorance (i.e., wise ignorance and popular ignorance) leads to a polarizing 
framework in which the few are taught solely Socratic humility and the many are merely 
recipients of opinions that fuel patriotism.  Without proper identification of Rousseau’s 
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praiseworthy forms of ignorance, one will not be led to a distinction between the uncorrupted 
and the corrupted, an integral distinction for determining the proper educational approach. 
If a society is not yet corrupted, then it does not make sense to remind that society of a 
former time in which it was in touch with natural sentiment.  To determine the extent to which a 
society or an individual has been or can be corrupted by the sciences and the arts, one must be 
aware that the few can withstand the dangers that threaten corruption, whereas the many cannot.  
One must also have an understanding of the type of ignorance that allows our natural 
connections to the basic moral principles to flourish, as well as Socrates’ humble form of 
ignorance.  As discussed earlier, ignorance (understood as the lack of knowledge and 
misperceptions and as the key to preserving natural sentiment’s guidance towards the most 
appropriate use of our faculties) is, by default, a beneficial state to preserve, and some who 
generally retain this form of ignorance may develop an awareness of their ignorance (i.e., 
Socrates’ humble ignorance).  It is only when an exceptional individual or society has been 
determined to have sufficient moral rectitude and strength of mind and character that the 
individual or society should be encouraged to engage in study (of philosophy and so on), as will 
be discussed. 
1. A Good Society Can Only Be Corrupted by the Arts and the Sciences 
Rousseau also argues that a potential educational reformer should consider the effect that 
the arts and the sciences would have on the society in question when determining whether or not 
to promote the arts and the sciences.  The educator has the difficult task of determining the 
degree of corruption, because there is a point at which a society’s loss of goodness necessitates 
50 
 
the employment of the sciences as a tempering force on the corrupted and vicious.  Rousseau 
explains,  
But once a people is to a certain extent corrupted, should the sciences – regardless of whether 
they did or did not contribute to the corruption – be banished, or the people be shielded from 
them, either in order to be improved, or to be kept from becoming worse? This is another 
question about which I positively declared for the negative.218 
In other words, although Rousseau cannot precisely say what that (tipping) point is for a specific 
society until he has knowledge of that society’s practices, morals, and customs,219 there is 
undoubtedly a point at which goodness has lost enough vigor so as to require the arts and the 
sciences to serve a tempering function in society.   
Before this degree of corruption has taken place, the sciences are not beneficial even as a 
distraction from more wicked deeds, according to Rousseau.
220
  A society that has preserved its 
natural sentiment and has not been given over to the corrupt passions would be better off without 
the arts.  Such a good society is already self-sufficient.  Introducing the arts and the sciences can 
only be corrupting on a society that has retained its goodness from nature.  If a society has 
retained is natural goodness, then it should not pursue the arts and the sciences.  Rousseau 
exclaims, “If the beauty of virtue were the product of art, virtue would have long since been 
disfigured!  As for me, even if I am again to be regarded as wicked for daring to assert that man 
is born good, I think it and believe that I have proved it.”221 
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The sciences and the arts in a good society could only work to the detriment of the good 
and to the benefit of the wicked, because the artists would seek to appeal to the lowest common 
denominator for their own personal gain.
222
  As it is easy to corrupt people’s natural sentiment 
into bad passions, appeal to the lowest common denominator would likely result in the 
production of art that exploits the passions without any benefit to the good people.  Rousseau 
states that the artist “will lower his genius to the level of his century and will prefer to compose 
popular works which are admired during his lifetime instead of marvels which would not be 
admired until long after his death.”223  
His attack against the arts and the sciences, or his praise of ignorance, is not to be 
confused with the ignorance of barbarism, which would be worse than the dependence upon vain 
pedants;
224
 Rousseau does not, by any means, promote a state of ignorant barbarism.  In fact, he 
decries the Dark Ages as “a state worse than ignorance.”225  Rousseau declares that “society is as 
natural to mankind as decrepitude is to the individual, and that Peoples need arts, Laws and 
Governments, as old men need crutches.”226  As Rousseau believes that good societies still exist 
today and can continue to exist,
227
 he is not referring to the age of a person or of a society in his 
suggestion that people need the arts and sciences.  Rather, he is referring to the age of our 
morals; morals can only go bad with age, because man begins good and becomes wicked only 
through the arts and society.
228
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Rousseau appears to hold that the theater tempts us to use a type of psychological defense 
mechanism through which we seek to esteem ourselves as good while avoiding the virtuous tasks 
that one must undertake as a moral agent.  Rousseau criticizes the act of paying homage to virtue 
at the theater in order to have a feeling of self-satisfaction with respect to virtue.
229
  The theater 
“reduces all the duties of man [. . .] to make us applaud our courage in praising that of others, our 
humanity in pitying the ills that we could have cured, our charity in saying to the poor, God will 
help you!”230  Instead of taking it upon ourselves to do good deeds, we attend the theater and 
applaud the good characters to show whose side we are on.  However, for Rousseau, it is 
deplorable that people do not demonstrate their virtue in society instead of in a passive viewing 
of a performance. 
Moreover, the theater and perhaps other arts fail to make use of the natural sentiment of 
pity, because these entertainments only bring about pity through fear; fear is a momentary 
passion that does not, for Rousseau, translate the feeling of pity (which it produces) into any acts 
of humanity that could be performed outside of the theater.  Rousseau argues that, while “tragedy 
leads to pity through fear,” this type of pity is “a fleeting and vain emotion” and is only “a 
vestige of natural sentiment.”231  Unlike the pity that a human being who is in touch with natural 
sentiment would feel, this pity does not drive any acts of humanity, as it is a “sterile pity.”232  
Therefore, the theater does not make use of the natural sentiment of pity, which could stem 
people to good action in society if they were not continually corrupted by the fear that the theater 
produces in them. 
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Rousseau argues that small towns or cities are much more capable of remaining good 
societies than are big cities.
233
  However, offering the example of a small town's uncorrupted 
society, Rousseau contends that the inhabitants of a mountain dwelling who live a simple, rustic 
lifestyle, read “useful books,” and are all industrious enough to be capable of making and using 
their own tools
234
 would be corrupted by the big city’s amusements, such as the theater.  “I see, 
in the first place, that their labors will cease to be their amusements and that, as soon as they 
have a new amusement, it will undermine their taste for the old ones.”235  This also furthers 
Rousseau’s argument that the forms of entertainment that the arts provide can only be a 
corrupting influence on a society that is already good. 
For Rousseau, Geneva is the paragon of the healthy-sized society that has retained its 
goodness.  If a theater were to be established in Geneva, he would “predict unhappy effects.”236  
Rousseau, it should be noted, consistently held a positive view of Genevans; “the Genevan is 
naturally good. [. . .] he needs only good examples to be turned entirely to the good,” Rousseau 
writes, in a 1755 letter to the Comte de Tressan.
237
 
2. A Bad Society Can Benefit from the Arts and the Sciences 
However, once Rousseau has demonstrated in the preceding pages the great deal of 
harmful corruption that can result from the theater, Rousseau concedes that there are some 
benefits to the establishment of a theater (although not in Geneva).  He argues, “when the people 
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is corrupted, the theater is good for it, and bad for it when it is itself good.”238  To incorporate 
into this picture the sciences and arts generally, one can look at Rousseau’s statement in the 
“Preface to ‘Narcissus,’” “My opinion, as I have already said more than once, is therefore to 
preserve and even carefully to support Academies, Colleges, Universities, Libraries, Spectacles 
and all the other amusements that might to some extent distract men’s wickedness, and prevent 
them from spending their idleness in more dangerous pursuits.”239  Thus, Rousseau holds that 
learning and the arts are distractions that can keep people’s minds off of mischievous activities.  
If a society has been corrupted, in other words, then the arts and the sciences can beneficially 
become part of that society’s moral education. 
Those who spend their lives in pursuit of harmful tasks are among those whom the arts 
and the sciences would distract to positive effect.  “Reason dictates the encouragement of the 
amusements of people whose occupations are harmful, and the turning-away from the same 
amusements of those whose occupations are beneficial,” writes Rousseau.240  Whereas the 
members of the small mountain village that was mentioned earlier are rightly turned away from 
the sciences due to their participation in activities that contribute to the good of the community, 
many in corrupted societies would be rightly encouraged to attend the theater and to spend their 
time occupied by useless study. 
While a small town or city is conducive to a good society, a large city is vulnerable to 
significant moral corruption.  Rousseau declares, “in a big city, I say, the police can never 
increase the number of permitted pleasures too much,”241 because this occupies people who 
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might otherwise pursue pleasures that are more harmful to society.
242
  In contrast, small cities 
allow for greater scrutiny by community members of one another, and such a system of living is 
not favorable to the big-city practice of hiding one’s morals by taking advantage of the capacity 
to develop a reputation without having to always be in the view of the busy public.
243
 He is 
pointing to the anonymity that one experiences, and some surely seek, in big cities.  One can 
imagine that, if one’s moral character is degraded or one does not participate in community life 
while in a small town, then others who see one on a regular basis will notice one’s altered 
behavior or avoidance of the community.  In contrast, imagine life in a metropolis in which one 
can easily act immorally or crudely towards the people one encounters, many of whom one may 
never see again and hardly any of whom one knows by name or with whom one experiences a 
sense of community.   
In an argument for small towns or cities stemming directly from his defense of ignorance 
as conducive to clarity of mind, Rousseau contends that one’s inner genius develops better when 
afforded life in a small town.  As people live more rustically and do not need to be engaged in 
the many activities that city life often demands, people in small towns are not distracted and have 
the luxury to examine things.
244
  Being able to look beyond appearances (which one might be 
overwhelmed with in Paris), and being presented with less of them, one puts one’s own thoughts 
and genius into any analysis or creative endeavor.  Rousseau explains that “more original spirits, 
more inventive industry, more really new things are found there because the people are less 
imitative; having few models, each draws more from himself and puts more of his own in 
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everything he does.”245  As one is also driven more by passionate interest and less by fortune and 
fame, one also finds that the genius of individuals is put to more genuine (and less exploitative) 
use in smaller cities than in big cities.
246
 
One might wonder just how small of a town, or how large of a city, Rousseau had in 
mind.  According to the Historical Dictionary of Switzerland, Geneva had approximately 20,000 
inhabitants throughout the course of the 1700s.
247
  Brion de la Tour’s 1789 book on the 
population of Paris records several calculated estimates, ranging from 500,000 to one million. 
Most of these estimates hover around 500,000 to 700,000 Parisian inhabitants.
248
   
Although Paris and Geneva are not absolute paragons, they might be as close as one 
could get, during Rousseau’s time, to a corrupt and to an upright, pure society, respectively.  
While Rousseau argues that a theater is not fit for Geneva,
249
 Paris and other “Great cities”250 
typically need theaters.  Given Rousseau’s opinion of Geneva, then, Rousseau’s critique of vain 
and wicked learned men is clearly directed at societies akin to the Paris of his time.  It is in this 
way that Rousseau’s role as a playwright makes no contradiction with his opinions in the First 
Discourse; Rousseau’s plays were performed in Paris and not in Geneva.  Rousseau’s novel 
Julie, furthermore, is a novel for corrupt people who have yet to be fully corrupted.
251
  The 
promotion of morals in novels is one more proper way in which a corrupted society can be 
educated by the arts. We are perfectly self-sufficient prior to the need for arts and governments, 
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but even when we do become weaker and dependent on arts and governments, Julie, or the New 
Heloise, and other decent works of art are potentially helpful in curbing or correcting the 
corruption of society.  However, as he states in the Preface to Julie, Rousseau wishes that he 
“had lived in an age when I should have thrown [these letters] into the fire!”252 
3. An Educator Should Consider the Effects of Learning on the Individual 
At the individual level as well, an educator should promote or discourage philosophy, the 
arts, and the sciences based on whether the person in question would be corrupted by study.  In 
other words, as the earlier discussions of true and false philosophers would suggest, an educator 
must distinguish not only between societies but within societies.  As reflected in Rousseau’s 
correspondence with them, some intellectuals during Rousseau’s time interpreted him as a critic 
of “all Learned men and Artists;”253 however, Rousseau believed that he had made himself 
entirely clear in the First Discourse on the difference between, for example, the true philosopher 
and the abundance of false philosophers. He sarcastically replies to Monsieur Raynal, “since you 
insist, I agree to eliminate all the distinctions I had drawn.”254   
There are those for whom the study of philosophy would corrupt their souls.  Promoting 
the study of philosophy to them would have an ill effect on society, because it would produce 
corrupted, vain, arrogant people.
255
  If the pupil or society in question is able to withstand the 
threats that study poses, then that pupil or society can benefit from learning and philosophy and 
can be encouraged to study.  If, on the other hand, the pupil or society is at risk of corruption 
from study, then that pupil or society should not be given to study.  As Rousseau states, “Study 
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corrupts his morals, affects his health, ruins his temperament, and often spoils his reason: even if 
it did teach him something, it would seem to me to be a poor compensation.”256  The pursuit of 
philosophy, the arts, and the sciences would not only corrupt many of those who pursue them but 
also would eventually create a society that is governed by deceit, hatred, and insincerity, none of 
which is conducive to virtue and to the sense of community at which Rousseau aims.
257
 
 However, the good and true philosophers, such as Socrates, are not harmed by study.
258
  
Good and true philosophers pursue their studies “for the good of all”259 and, thus, become neither 
corrupted nor corrupting by study.  They retain their goodness and humility as their knowledge 
increases.
260
  Thus, even within a given society, the promotion of the sciences and the arts should 
be tailored to the people in question.  The arts and sciences would corrupt many good people, 
and, again, Rousseau’s first concern is with people who have retained their natural goodness.261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
256
 Rousseau.  “Preface to ‘Narcissus,’” 102. 
257
 Rousseau.  First Discourse, 4. 
258
 Rousseau.  “Preface to ‘Narcissus,’” 102. 
259
 Ibid., 102. 
260
 Rousseau.  First Discourse, 8-9. 
261
 Rousseau.  “Preface to ‘Narcissus,’” 104. 
59 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 To not only exalt ignorance but to exalt it in the broadest range of contexts, from the 
savage to Socrates, suggests that ignorance is, for Rousseau, a topic worthy of serious 
consideration.  Ignorance is not, however, a simple concept for Rousseau, who discusses a 
number of different forms of ignorance.  Orwin, Black, Garrard, and other scholars who have 
recognized ignorance as a significant topic in Rousseau’s approach to moral education have not 
been sufficiently sensitive to the various meanings of ignorance.  At minimum, ignorance can 
refer to a humble sort of ignorance, as elucidated in the example of Socrates in the First 
Discourse, or it can refer to a type of ignorance in which the natural tendencies of the mind to 
judge accurately but not to exceed its limits are maintained and in which knowledge and any 
misconceptions are absent.  The latter form of ignorance is a prerequisite for consciously 
acknowledging one’s own ignorance in an effort to achieve the good.  Our human nature leads us 
to be curious about what is in our interest, and our natural sentiment leads us to our good.   
As long as natural sentiment remains our guide, we stay near to the basic moral principles 
that we naturally intuit, and we are guided to morally upright behavior.  Connection to our 
natural sentiment prevents us from vainly seeking to exceed the limitations of natural faculties, a 
potential danger by which men often become increasingly corrupted.  Our natural state of 
ignorance, by presenting less danger to our good than the false convictions, vain pursuits, and 
muddled mind that almost inevitably are produced in the process of learning, is the condition that 
we should strive to maintain.  When we learn to compare ourselves to others with the onset of 
reason, we are presented with the danger of learning to view others as competitors, as inferiors, 
or as the objects of our vain musings, and our amour-propre may become inflamed, instead of 
serving as a source of the desire for deserved honor or for the respect that is due to each human 
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being.  Rousseau, who seeks first to preserve the natural goodness of those who are still good, 
advocates ignorance in order to provide goodness with its strongest foundation in society – the 
naturally good sentiments of its members prior to corruption by society or by other individuals. 
Rousseau, however, is well aware that preserving this natural goodness is not always 
effective or a great possibility.  One cannot be true to Rousseau’s understanding of moral 
education without sensitivity to the individual or the society to be educated. The uncorrupted 
individual or society, along with the ignorance of the arts and the sciences that is essential to that 
individual or society’s natural goodness, must be maintained to the extent possible.  Society may 
benefit the most by educating the corrupted society or individual, on the other hand, in the arts 
and the sciences, as learning may be a necessary remedy at that stage.  Moreover, for those 
whom learning would corrupt, Rousseau prefers that they would remain ignorant. Only Socrates 
and other individuals who can withstand the threats to their goodness and humility should 
receive education in philosophy. 
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